INTRODUCTION
Fire following earthquake refers to series of events or stochastic process initiated by a large earthquake. Fires following earthquakes are generally only a very significant problem in a large metropolitan area predominantly comprised of densely spaced wood buildings. In such circumstances, the multiple simultaneous ignitions can lead to catastrophic conflagrations that by far are the dominant agent of damage for that event. A large earthquake such as a M7.8 event on the San Andreas Fault in southern California (or comparable events in northern California, Puget Sound, or the Lower Mainland of British Columbia) combines all the requisite factors for major conflagrations that, depending on circumstances, can be of uniquely catastrophic proportions. This paper was prepared as part of the ShakeOut Scenario and exercise, with the purpose of qualitatively describing fires following a M7.8 earthquake on the Southern San Andreas Fault, with primary emphasis for assisting emergency planning. The scenario specified the earthquake occurs on 13 November 2008, a day with average November weather conditions, and no Santa Ana winds; that the scenario should be "realistic" and not some "worst case"; and should address the following questions: (i) provide a realistic scenario of ignitions, fire growth and spread; (ii) How will ignitions be reported after an earthquake, how will fire departments respond, and how long will it take for the fires to be extinguished? What mutual aid agreements are in place and how will they be activated? (iii) How will damage to telecommunications, water supply, and roadway damage affect response? (iv) What, if any, effective mitigation actions have been undertaken elsewhere that might be practical in Southern California? (v) Briefly state the limitations of the FFE scenario, and summarize, if appropriate, research that would provide a more realistic, perhaps more challenging or detailed, scenario.
BACKGROUND
Large fires, for example measured in terms of square miles of burnt area, have not been unique to fires following earthquakes-indeed, the great fires of London (1666) and Chicago (1871) are only the most noteworthy of a long succession of nonearthquake-related urban conflagrations. Large urban conflagrations were actually the norm in nineteenthcentury America, so that long experience allowed the National Board of Fire Underwriters to state with some confidence (NBFU 1905): "...In fact, San Francisco has violated all underwriting traditions and precedent by not burning up. That it has not done so is largely due to the vigilance of the fire department, which cannot be relied upon indefinitely to stave off the inevitable."
While the 1906 San Francisco earthquake had major geological effects and damaged many buildings, it was the fire that resulted in 80% of the total damage-a fire foreseen and expected, irrespective of an earthquake. As the fire service was professionalized in the twentieth century, with improvements in equipment, communications, training, and organization, urban conflagrations tended largely to become a thing of the past (National Commission on Fire Prevention and Control 1973). Largely, but not entirely, however, as witnessed in the 1991 East Bay Hills fire, where 3,500 buildings were destroyed in a matter of hours.
Still, the two largest peace-time urban conflagrations in history have been fires following earthquakes-1906 San Francisco and 1923 Tokyo, the latter event's fires causing the great majority of the 140,000 fatalities.
Much larger wildland fires also occur of course, and continue to be a major source of loss, including in Southern California almost every year. However, historically earthquakes have typically not caused major wildland fires.
Although a combination of a professionalized fire service, improved water supply and better building practices has largely eliminated non-earthquake related large urban conflagrations in the United States, there is still a gap-an Achilles heel-which is fire following earthquake. This is due to the correlated effects of a large earthquake simultaneously causing numerous ignitions, degrading building fire resistive features, dropping pressure in water supply mains, saturating communications and transportation routes, and thus allowing some fires to quickly grow into conflagrations that outstrip local resources. It is not sufficiently appreciated that the key to modern fire protection is a well-drilled rapid response by professional firefighters in the early stages of structural fires, arriving in time to suppress the fire while that is still relatively feasible. A typical response goal for urban fire departments for example is four minutes from time of report to arrival. If suppression is delayed, due either to delayed response, or lack of water, a single structural fire can quickly spread to neighboring buildings and grow to the point where an entire municipality's fire resources and perhaps even assistance from neighboring communities are required. This is for a single ignition. Simply put, most fire departments are not sized or equipped to cope with the fires following a major earthquake. A major earthquake and its associated fires is a low-probability event for which, although it has very high potential consequences, it may not be feasible to adequately prepare. There are exceptions to this; the San Francisco Fire Department, Los Angeles City Fire Department, Vallejo Fire Department, and Vancouver (B.C.) Fire and Rescue Services have all undertaken special measures, which will be discussed below.
MODELING OF FIRE FOLLOWING EARTHQUAKE
The first step toward solving any problem is analyzing the problem and quantifying its effects. A full probabilistic methodology for analysis of fire following earthquake was developed in the late 1970s (Scawthorn et al. 1981) and has been applied to major cities in western North America (Scawthorn and Khater 1992) . A recent monograph (TCLEE 2005) and review paper (Lee et al. 2008 ) details the current state of the art in modeling fire following earthquake, so that only a brief review is presented here. In summary, the steps in the process are shown in Figure 1 : 
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Occurrence of the earthquake: Causing damage to buildings and contents, even if the damage is as simple as knockings things (such as candles or lamps) over.
Ignition: Whether a structure has been damaged or not, ignitions will occur due to earthquakes. The sources of ignitions are numerous, ranging from overturned heat sources, to abraded and shorted electrical wiring, to spilled chemicals having exothermic reactions, to the friction of things rubbing together.
Discovery: At some point, the fire resulting from the ignition will be discovered, if it has not self-extinguished (this aspect is discussed further below). In the confusion following an earthquake, the discovery may take longer than it might otherwise.
Report: If it is not possible for the person or persons discovering a fire to immediately extinguish it, fire department response will be required. For the fire department to respond, a report to the fire department has to be made. Communications system dysfunction and saturation will delay many reports.
Response:
The fire department then has to respond, but is impeded by nonfire-damage emergencies that also require response (e.g., building collapse), as well as transportation disruptions.
Suppression:
The fire department then has to suppress the fire. If the fire department is successful, they move on to the next incident. If the fire department is not successful, they continue to attempt to control the fire, but it spreads, possibly becoming conflagration. Success or failure hinges on numerous factors including water supply functionality, building construction and density, wind and humidity conditions, etc.
This process is also shown in Figure 2 , which shows a fire department operations timeline. Time is of the essence for the fire following earthquake problem. In this figure, the horizontal axis is time, beginning at the time of the earthquake, while the vertical axis presents a series of horizontal bars of varying width. Each of these bars depicts the development of one fire, from ignition through growth or increasing size (size is indicated by the width or number of bars).
The analysis of the ShakeOut Scenario followed the above succession of events although given the resources available for the project, approximations were employed at several steps in the analysis. However, ignitions, response, and fire spread were modeled at the ZIP code level, with over 700 ZIP codes considered in the analysis. We begin by briefly presenting the scenario earthquake and associated framework, particularly its intensity distribution. We then use simple rules of thumb to estimate the approximate number and distribution of ignitions, and compare these against resources to identify those areas where large fires may be expected to occur. We discuss citizen response and reporting, fire service response and other factors to arrive at an estimate of overall impacts. We then review opportunities for mitigating the fire following earthquake problem and conclude with remarks on some mitigation steps that might be taken.
SCENARIO EARTHQUAKE AND PREVAILING CONDITIONS
The scenario event is a M7.8 earthquake on the Southern San Andreas Fault, Figure 3 . Seismological aspects are discussed by others in this issue and the MMI distribution 
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employed here was developed by others and is shown in Figure 4 (Graves et al. 2011) . Noteworthy are the high intensities MMI VIII-X along the fault (to be expected), but also the relatively high intensities, MMI VI-VIII throughout the Los Angeles Basin, northern Orange County and in the San Fernando Valley. For comparison, Figure 6 shows the MMI and ignition patterns for the 1994 Northridge earthquake.
The counties and populations affected by the scenario are shown in Table 1 -the total affected population is approximately 19 million, and is distributed as shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5 . Current fire service specific data for the entire region was not readily available for Note that population data differs from Table 4 due to different year and data source. this paper but based on previous data the total number of fire engines in the affected counties is estimated at just under 2,000 (Table 2 ). Only fire engines (i.e., pumpers) are considered as they apply water in urban structural fires-ladder trucks and other apparatus are also necessary to assist, but without fire engines, suppression of a structural fire is usually not possible.
In Southern California, November climate tends to have a "bimodal" distributionsome storms occur, with precipitation and lower temperatures, but Santa Ana conditions are relatively prevalent, with very high winds and extremely low humidity. Indeed, the worst fire season in Southern California is October-November. For the scenario, breezy conditions (10 mph) and relatively low humidity were specified. 
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FIRE FOLLOWING EARTHQUAKE ASPECTS
Based on methods previously developed (Scawthorn 1987 , TCLEE 2005 and employing population data for the region and intensity data from the scenario, the total number of fire ignitions likely to occur in the scenario was calculated to be approximately 1,600, as shown in Table 3 and Figure 7 . These are ignitions that require fire department response; there will be other minor ignitions that are suppressed immediately by citizens and typically not even reported and are not considered here. Table 3 shows that about 70% of the losses occur in Los Angeles County, due to about 600 fires. The approximately 600 fires for Los Angeles county can be verified using for example, HAZUS-MH (FEMA 2003) , which provides a regression for estimation of ignitions:
Ignitions ¼ À0:025 þ ð0:592 Ã PGAÞ À ð0:289 Ã PGÞ
( 1) where PGA is peak ground acceleration (g) and Ignitions is ignitions per million sq. ft. of building floor area. This regression results in 0.226 ignitions per million sq. ft. of building floor area for example for PGA ¼ 0.6, or on average about 1 ignition per 4.4 million sq. ft. Table 4 shows the application of this equation for Los Angeles County, which results in an The cause of ignitions would likely be similar to causes in the 1994 Northridge earthquake, which is the best U.S. data set for recent fires following an earthquake; about half of all ignitions would be electrical-related, a quarter gas-related, and the remainder due to a variety of causes, including chemical reaction (Table 5) . It is worth noting that, although electric power often fails during the earthquake shaking in high intensity areas, electrically caused ignitions still occur, due either to arcing before power fails, stored energy in electrical appliances, and/or when power is restored. Also, based on the Northridge experience, Table 5 . General sources of ignition, LAFD data, Northridge earthquake (Scawthorn et al. 1998) Source Fraction Electrical 56% Gas-related 26% Other 18% about half of all ignitions would typically occur in single-family residential dwellings, with another 26% in multifamily residential occupancies, that is, about 70% of all ignitions occur in residential occupancies. Educational facilities would be a small percentage of all ignitions (3% in Northridge), and most of these are due to exothermic reactions of spilled chemicals in chemistry laboratories.
Of particular concern is the large number of oil refineries, tank farms, and related facilities in and around Long Beach. These facilities are responsible for half of California's gasoline and one third of the refined gasoline west of the Rockies. When strongly shaken, oil refineries and tank farms have typically had large fires which have burned for days. Examples include the Showa refinery in the 1964 M w 7.5 Niigata (Japan) earthquake, the Tüpraçs refinery in the 1999 M w 7.6 Marmara (Turkey) earthquake (Figure 9, Scawthorn 2000) , and the Idemitsukosan Hokkaido refinery fire in the 2003 M JMA 8.0 Tokachi-oki earthquake (Figure 10 ). While the Long Beach area is shown to have lower-intensity shaking, the long period effects at the site from the M7.8 scenario event has the potential to cause large sloshing in tanks and fires. To put this in perspective, the 2003 Tokachi event caused one tank fire at a 140,000 bbl/day facility 230 km from the event epicenter, while the ShakeOut Scenario is 80 km distant from 1.1 million bbl/day aggregate refining capacity.
The approximately 1,600 ignitions requiring fire department response will initially be responded to by citizens. As noted, they will be able to suppress some fires, which are not actually included in the 1,600. When they realize the fire is beyond their capabilities, they will endeavor to call the fire department, by telephone since fire alarm street pull boxes have largely disappeared from the U.S. urban landscape. Attempts to report via 911, Figure 9 . Tüpraçs refinery, M w 7.41999 Marmara (Turkey) earthquake. Photo by G. Johnson in Scawthorn (2000) . however, will often be unsuccessful, due not so much to damage to the telephone system but to simple saturation of the system and 911 call centers. Citizens will then travel to the nearest fire station, but such "still alarms" will be largely unneeded, since the fire companies will have already responded to the nearest fire ("self-dispatched"), if not dispatched by 911.
Experience shows that citizens on scene will respond rationally (Van Anne 1989) rescuing as many people as possible and protecting exposures. Water supply from mains (discussed below) will often be unavailable but in Southern California, backyard swimming pools are a valuable and widespread resource (Scawthorn et al. 1998 ).
The Los Angeles City Fire Department (LAFD) and other fire departments have for several decades developed Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT, see http://www.cert-la. com). A total count of citizens who have undergone CERT training is not available but is several tens of thousands. Individually, and then as organized CERT teams, these teams will save lives and make a difference. However, large conflagrations challenge even the best equipped and trained professionals, and for these fires, the CERT teams' contribution will be modest.
The initial response of fire companies and personnel in the region of the scenario will be to self-protect during violent shaking, and as soon as possible, to open the doors and remove apparatus from the fire stations. Different departments have somewhat varying earthquake procedures but in general, companies will remove apparatus to a predesignated location-often simply in front of the fire station-check the station for damage, and perform a radio check. By this time, typically within five minutes, they will either have selfdispatched to an observed smoke column, responded to a citizen still alarm, or been instructed to mobilize with other companies into a strike team.
Local fire service resources will be completely committed and in need of assistance from outside the region. The primary needs will be personnel, additional hose, hard suction hose, foam, light equipment (gloves, hand tools, self-contained breathing apparatus, or SCBA) and heavy equipment (cranes, bulldozers, backhoes). Additional fire apparatus (pumpers and ladder trucks) will not be the primary need, initially, but will still prove useful as extraregional strike teams arrive.
In the initial stage, personnel needs may be significantly supplemented by CERT teams but will be more significantly strengthened by the recall of off-duty trained firefighters. Offduty personnel can be expected to have doubled staffing within 3-6 hours, and tripled it within 12-24 hours. While responding, an issue will be how these personnel marry up with their companies, and there will be some inefficiencies as personnel join first available companies. Nevertheless, arrival of off-duty personnel will be very important, to spell on-duty personnel nearing their physical limits.
As noted above, 911 centers will be overwhelmed, and doing as much as possible to triage events and dispatch resources. Reports of fires during the initial period will be haphazard. Most fire departments do not have their own helicopters, and TV helicopter news reporting will be a valuable resource for a few major incidents, but not most. An anecdote demonstrates this-the first knowledge the San Francisco Fire Department's Emergency Operations Center (EOC) had of the Marina fire in the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake was from television news reports (despite several engine companies having already responded). Quickly gaining an accurate, complete situational awareness is still a challenge.
Local, county, and state EOCs will activate within a very short period, certainly within an hour, and in some cases more quickly. Automatic and mutual aid in the affected region will largely be ineffective, due to all departments having no resources to spare. The State of California emergency services are organized into six mutual aid regions, with the scenario earthquake occurring at the crux of three of these regions (I, V, and VI). It will take several hours for these three regions to have a first needs assessment (longer if the earthquake occurs during nightfall, but this scenario assumes a 10:00 a.m. event), although the state office of emergency services (OES) will already have dispatched strike teams from other regions.
FIRE SPREAD
The initial 1,600 ignitions will not all develop into conflagrations. There are approximately 2,000 fire engines in the region, and many will be close by and able to rapidly respond to ignitions. Figure 8 shows a detail of Figure 7 , centered around ZIP code 90002 in central Los Angeles, and it shows one trial simulation of ignition locations, vis-à-vis fire stations. It can be seen there are more ignitions than resources so that the normal four-minute structural fire response goal will hardly be met. This delayed response, due to some areas having more fires than nearby engines, as well as delayed reporting due primarily to failure of the 911 system, will result in many of the fires on arrival having grown such that a multi-engine capacity is needed. That is, especially in low humidity conditions, an unfought ignition will grow into a room-sized fire within several minutes, and a fully involved single-family structural fire within several more. To protect neighboring buildings ("exposures"), typically two or more fire companies are needed. If only one company is available, it's possible that it might be able to adequately protect two exposures (using monitor and a hand line, with civilian assistance), but not always. In fire following earthquake modeling, such fires, where the fire exceeds one engine company's capabilities, are termed "large fires". Based on these considerations, the number of large fires for the scenario event was calculated to be approximately 1,200 (Table 3) .
This does not consider ignitions in wildland or at the wildland urban interface (WUI), which are an ongoing problem in California. Figure 13 shows, for example, the "California Fire Siege" of 2007, a series of fires in Southern California which destroyed more than 3,000 homes and involved 1,400 fire engines under nonearthquake conditions. About a third of this scenario's large fires occur in Imperial, Kern, Riverside, and San Bernardino Counties, where building density is relatively low, so that even though the fires are initially uncontrollable, their spread within the built environment will be limited due to low density; in effect, they will burn themselves out. Only within the more densely built areas of Los Angeles (see Figure 15) and Orange Counties will there be relatively large fire spread, developing into conflagrations. In these areas, each ignition that is not quickly responded to will within a few tens of minutes grow into a multiple building fire which under normal conditions would be a multiple alarm fire requiring the response of perhaps half a dozen fire engines and other apparatus. Because there won't be enough engines to respond adequately to all such fires, a significant number of fires will grow into city block and then multiblock conflagrations. The probability of fire spread across streets and other fire breaks was considered in this analysis and may be corroborated by data, such as that provided in the HAZUS fire following earthquake model, which indicates a 50% probability of fire spread across a street with widths typical of central Los Angeles (i.e., 100 ft. building-front-to-building-front distance, as shown in Figure 15 ), based on light winds and no active fire suppression. For an uncombatted fire with a 50% probability of crossing a street downwind and 25% probability of crossing a street upwind or sidewind, it can easily be Figure 11 . Probability of crossing firebreak (FEMA 2003) .
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shown that the mean total burnt area is 3.88 city blocks. Residential blocks in central Los Angeles have on average about 50 houses and low-rise commercial buildings per block, averaging about 1,500 sq. ft. per building (including outbuildings, which are numerous; see Figure 15 ), so that the average burnt building floor area in light winds is about 290,000 sq. ft per uncombatted ignition. For the 583 large fires estimated to occur in Los Angeles County, the mean burnt area is thus about 170 million sq. ft. of total burnt building floor area. Using more detailed calculations, actual burnt areas are somewhat less and are shown in Table 3 .
The performance of lifelines, such as water supply, gas, electric power, communications, and transportation, is integral to the fire following earthquake process. Others considered the performance of lifelines for the ShakeOut Scenario, and this paper only briefly discusses this aspect with regard to fire following earthquake. Water supply will be severely impacted by the scenario event. Generally, only local water supply is relevant to the fire following earthquake process. Water pressure will drop in some portions of the more heavily shaken area due to pipe breaks and tank failures, despite widespread efforts over the last several decades to upgrade water supply systems in California. Fire departments in many areas will have to resort to alternative water supplies (creeks, ponds, swimming pools, etc.). 
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They will be handicapped in this, since most engine companies today do not carry hard suction hose, although following the Northridge earthquake, the LAFD was able to make good use of swimming pools using 1.5 in. siphon ejectors (Scawthorn et al. 1998 ). This initial lack of water supply will add to the number of large fires.
Gas-related ignitions account for about 25% of the total number of ignitions. If the number of ignitions could be reduced from 1,600 to 1,200, the number of large fires would be decreased in greater proportion, and the total losses further reduced. Automatic gas shut-off valves are the best way to reduce gas-related ignitions, and should be mandated in densely built areas. The LAFD has shown excellent leadership in seeking legislation to require gas shut-off valves.
Communications systems, particularly telephone, will sustain some damage but not enough to reduce functionality following the scenario event. However, saturation will reduce functionality to a great degree, for several hours or more. This lack of telephone service will result in delayed reporting, with consequences as discussed above.
As noted earlier, the scenario earthquake is at the junction of OES Regions I, V and VI, (Figure 12 ). Within those three regions, the only available significant fire service resources would appear to be those in the San Diego region, and OES brush rigs in the Sierra Foothills. It is unlikely that many resources will be made available from the San Diego region, out of concern by local governments there of a sympathetic seismic event closer to their region (there may also be some damage in and around San Diego, even at that distance). A more likely source of regional resources will be a number of strike teams assembled by OES from the southern Sierra region, arriving in the affected region within 6-24 hours. While brush rigs are more suited to wildland than urban structural fires, by the time of their arrival, the issue will be large fires that have grown into conflagrations, a situation a bit closer to the norm for brush rigs and associated tanker trucks.
Outside the affected region, the OES is likely to stage a number of strike teams, drawn generally from the Central Valley and the San Francisco Bay Area. One hundred strike teams, consisting of approximately 500 pumpers and other apparatus, firefighters and officers, is easily within the OES's capability, and several times this can be managed in extremis. One hundred strike teams can be assumed to arrive at staging areas within about 12 hours, with probably another one hundred over the next week.
FINAL BURNT AREA
The approximately 1,200 large fires will be spread over a large area, of varying building density, and only a relatively few will grow into major conflagrations. Under the assumed wind and humidity conditions, Riverside and San Bernardino counties are each likely to sustain one or several conflagrations destroying several city blocks.
The real concern is portions of Orange County and especially the central Los Angeles basin, where a large plain of relatively uniform dense low-rise buildings provides a fuel bed such that dozens to hundreds of large fires are likely to merge into dozens of conflagrations destroying tens of city blocks, and several of these merging into one or several super conflagrations destroying hundreds of city blocks. Two special concerns exist in this regard: (a) if Santa Ana winds exist (which is not the assumed scenario), losses can be much larger, and (b) if extremely calm conditions exist (which is also not the assumed scenario), the potential exists for a symmetric wind pattern to develop caused by air drawn inward by uprising air from super conflagrations (an example of stack effect). A self-sustaining feedback situation can develop (commonly termed a firestorm), which can be very destructive. While relatively unlikely, this potential should not be ignored. Concern (a) is simply a larger mass conflagration, fed by higher winds. Concern (b) is potentially much worse. Both are potentially catastrophic.
Under the assumed scenario conditions, analysis shows that the approximately 1,200 large fires will result in an ultimate burnt area equivalent to approximately 200 million sq. ft. of residential and commercial building floor area, or 133,000 single-family dwellings (SFED 1 ). To put this in perspective, Los Angeles county (particularly central Los Angeles) will sustain about 600 fires and a total burnt area of about 140 million sq ft. of building floor area. On average this is about 240,000 sq. ft. of building floor area burnt per fire, or about 2.5 city blocks per fire, that is, loss of entire city block and loss of about three quarters of the blocks on either side (i.e., fire jumps one street each way, then burns out). Given the densities of wood buildings in Los Angeles as shown in Figure 15 (discussed further below), this is not unreasonable.
IMPACTS OF FIRE FOLLOWING EARTHQUAKE SCENARIO
Estimating fatalities associated with fires following the scenario earthquake is very problematic. A very simple approach is taken here-in the 1991 East Bay Hills fire, which destroyed approximately 3,500 dwellings, 25 persons perished. The building losses projected here are approximately 40 times larger. A pro rata estimate would indicate 1,000 deaths due to fire following earthquake, but such an approach is admittedly very simplistic. However, hundreds of deaths directly attributable to fire following earthquake is a conservatively low estimate. Injuries would probably be an order of magnitude greater. Shelter needs directly attributable to fire following earthquake are estimated to be hundreds of thousands of persons.
The ultimate burnt area of approximately 200 million sq. ft. of building floor area equates to approximately $40 billion of building value.
2 Value of contents and other improvements (e.g., landscaping), will only increase this loss. An additional loss is loss of use -that is, the persons normally living in these destroyed buildings (or conducting business in them) must find other accommodations, which will most likely not be available in the Los Angeles basin given the scenario event. This loss, termed additional living expenses by the insurance industry (for residential occupancies) and business interruption (for commercial occupancies), can be quite significant, equivalent to many tens of billions of dollars. Accounting for this is problematic-if persons who have lost their dwellings are housed in Figure 14 . (a) Los Angeles County drainage and storm drain system, and (b) photo of larger drainage channel. a hotel at insurance company expense, the accounting is easy; it's the hotel bill. But if they are forced to live in tents following the event, at public expense, there may be no bill.
3 In such a case, the persons haven't paid for their tent and can't therefore claim against the insurance company for a financial loss. However, they have lost value in services (of their house) approximately equivalent to the rental value of their house (minus the rental value of the tent) but won't be compensated for those losses. While something of an accounting exercise, this is a loss that should be accounted for, overall.
Since virtually all buildings and contents in the United States are insured for fire, and U.S. insurance contracts include fire following earthquake losses under the fire policy, the direct fire following earthquake losses for the scenario event could result in a loss approaching $100 billion of insurance claims. Losses of this magnitude are probably sustainable by the U.S. insurance industry, with some strains. For comparison, the 1991 East Bay Hills fire resulted in the loss of 3,500 homes with about $1 billion in insurance payments (1991 dollars) . The event projected here is 17 years of inflation later and about 40 times as large. The fire following earthquake losses are likely to be the largest portion of the insured losses in the scenario event, and could result in major distortions within the industry.
Another aspect of the economic impacts is the loss of tax revenues. A loss of $50 billion in value of improvements is likely to result in a decrease in regional real estate tax revenues approaching a billion dollars, for several years, directly attributable to fire following earthquake.
MITIGATION OF FIRE FOLLOWING EARTHQUAKE
Mitigation of fire following earthquake has been extensively discussed elsewhere (TCLEE 2005) so that only some limited observations specific to the scenario are provided here.
FIRE SERVICE OPPORTUNITIES
The fire service in Southern California is among the finest in the world and perhaps the best practiced in the world in dealing with large conflagrations, due to the wildland fires recurring annually in the region. The fire service has also been relatively diligent in preparing for a large earthquake; the CERT program is a model in that regard. However, the following mitigation opportunities are cited below, to name a few:
• Capability for more quickly assessing the incident and facilitating incident reporting, should be improved. Reconnaissance using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and mobile phone text messaging incident reports directly to a 911 portal, should be developed and operationalized. In this regard, mobile phone service will be crucial, but to the best of this author's knowledge, cellular phone towers currently do not have backup power.
• Alternative water supply capability needs to be enhanced. Hard suction hoses should be carried on all engines. Large diameter hose (LDH) systems, comparable to the San Francisco Fire Department's Portable Water Supply System (PWSS; Scawthorn et al. 2006) , should be developed on a regional basis.
• Los Angeles currently has little ability to access seawater and move it significant distances inland-relaying via street-laid hose and engines is not an efficient way of doing this. A special saltwater pumping system, similar to that of San Francisco's (built following the 1906 event) and Vancouver's (built in the 1990s and based on observations in the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake) is quite feasible for Los Angeles. Several saltwater pumping stations could be built (e.g., Santa Monica, LAX airport, Los Angeles Harbor) and large-diameter seismically resistant pipe could be laid in the Los Angeles River and other river channels and the County's extensive storm drain system (see Figure 14) to form a looped high-pressure system, accessible from high-pressure hydrants.
• A regional task force should be formed within the fire service, to examine urban conflagration potential in more detail. The task force should be multidisciplinary.
WATER SERVICE OPPORTUNITIES
The water service in Southern California has done a lot to prepare for a major earthquake, but more can of course still be done. One overriding issue with regard to fire following earthquake is that water agencies typically aren't institutionally responsible for fire protection. That is, while they provide hydrants, if the hydrants fail to supply water, they literally (legally) aren't responsible. This is not to say they don't care, but simply that there is an institutional gap, which tends to result in water system seismic upgrades more typically oriented to maintenance of customer service and to minimizing direct damage to the system, rather than to maximizing firewater supply reliability. A mandate needs to be developed to make water agencies more responsive to this need. Given the realities of water in California, this may be unlikely to occur, but should at least be considered. A real way in which water agencies could be more responsive to the fire following earthquake problem is if each agency were to configure and upgrade their system such that they provide a "backbone" system of water mains of high seismic reliability, that provided water to major sections of the community and from which the fire service could draw water to feed water to a conflagration via LDH systems (see also the discussion above regarding a saltwater looped system).
ENERGY INDUSTRY OPPORTUNITIES
The gas utility industry could contribute significantly to reducing the fire following earthquake problem by developing a program to either install automated gas shut-off valves or redesigned meters with seismic shutoffs in densely built up areas. More problematic are opportunities in regard to electricity. Electric power often fails in large earthquakes, due to automatic system trips as well as damage to the system. However, the power failure usually takes several seconds, during which power is a source of many ignitions. Certain electric appliances (e.g., those with heating elements) can still cause fires even after power is cut. Large-scale intentional curtailment of power is problematic, since some communications and other essential equipment would then be useless. The petroleum refineries and related facilities in the Long Beach area are likely to sustain major fires in the scenario event. Their earthquake preparedness should be reviewed.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Fires follow all earthquakes affecting human settlements but are potentially catastrophic phenomena in selected areas, such as Southern California. A large earthquake will occur on the Southern San Andreas Fault, perhaps similar to the scenario considered here. Just as the fires following the 1906 earthquake were quite foreseeable, the fires following a ShakeOut-like event are foreseeable and will likely constitute a significant portion of the overall impacts of that event.
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To put the loss estimates presented in this paper in perspective, Figure 15 is a series of aerial photos of the Los Angeles Basin taken from Google Earth that make two key points:
• The estimated 200 million sq. ft. of burnt building floor area, while an enormous loss, is only a small fraction of the exposure (1.5%). The red rectangles indicate the equivalent area (very approximately) relative to the total exposure.
• The images show the high density of wood buildings typical of the central Los Angeles Basin. Note the small interbuilding spacing and almost total building coverage of many blocks. While there are broader avenues and even freeways which serve as firebreaks, flying brands can easily drift thousands of feet and/or several miles downwind, easily crossing such firebreaks (this was seen, for example, in the 1991 East Bay Hills fire, where the fire jumped Highway 24, a ten-lane freeway).
As part of the ShakeOut Scenario development, the findings of this paper were reviewed by a panel of representatives of major fire departments in California, including Chief Donald Manning (Los Angeles City Fire Department, retired and former Chair, California Seismic Safety Commission), Chief Don Parker (Vallejo Fire Department, retired and Chair, California Seismic Safety Commission) and Captain Larry Collins (Los Angeles County Fire Department), all of whom concurred with its findings, with the only demur being that the estimates "might be a bit low."
While foreseeable, quantification of the fire following earthquake risk is still very imprecise. The only previous quantified estimates of fire following earthquake risk for Southern California were made one to two decades ago Khateer 1992, Scawthorn 1987) , and this paper is only a very approximate estimate. The size and importance of the problem warrants much more detailed analysis using the latest data and methods.
